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I learned the Torah
from all the limbs of my teacher.
Lionel Trilling
No Jew and no Christian has a right to live and
guide his actions as though the six million had
not died in agony. For this thing did not hap-
pen far away or long ago •••• It happened yes-
terdaYi it has not ceased happening.
Ludwig Lewisohn
The following essay is part of a study of the circulation of ethnic
materials (in particular African American and Jewish American materials) in
American literary culture. My focus in this paper is on the Holocaust and
its place in the construction of modern American literary criticism. I am
interested in moments when Holocaust materials appear in critical texts,
not (as in Holocaust studies) as directly articulated subjects of discus-
sion, but rather in their repression or displacement onto other issues. My
claim is that much modern American criticism is Holocaust-inflected. Prin-
cipally I mean by this that there exist in contemporary literary studies
traditions of critical thought that can be understood as having been shaped
by Holocaust events, either directly or indirectly, and that constitute
responses to those events--even if those responses are rarely explicit and
need to be teased out of the works under discussion. While some critical
writing (the cultural criticism exemplified by Lionel Trilling, for exam-
pIe) can be understood as intentionally positioning itself in relation to
the Holocaust, other critical enterprises (New Historicism/Americanism and
Deconstruction, for example) may register a Holocaust consciousness only
obliquely and inadvertently. Let me emphasize again that, in the cases of
all of the critics I will be discussing, including Trilling, I am
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interested in what we might think of as a "silent" speaking about Holocaust
realities--moments when the Holocaust both is and is not a subject of dis-
cussion. Accordingly, some of the questions toward which my investigation
in this essay will tend are: how do we differentiate among different kinds
of silent speaking? what are the consequences of such silent speaking in
one or another of its varieties? and when and how and to what consequence
do we hear or fail to hear this kind of speaking?
These questions are related to another subject I consider: the extent
to which writers and critics either participate in the construction of cul-
tureor permit themselves (whatever their strategies of opposition) to be
constructed by it. Whether, and where, and how, we place the Holocaust as
one of the determinative events of recent history, will, I argue, affect
our understanding of, and participation in, the paradoxical constructions
of and by culture. Contemporary literary theories, such as New Americanism
and Deconstruction, direct our attention to important areas of moral con-
cern. They provide strategies for identifying and deconstructing power
relations within culture and society. Neither of these critical schools,
however, possesses a conceptual framework for either understanding or
attempting to remediate the deeply ingrained antipathies (as between races
and religions) that are not, per se, power-based. This is the kind of
antipathy that, in one vast instance, recently (fifty years ago) expressed
itself in the extermination of six million Jews. Confronting the facts of
the Holocaust, I suggest, forces literary critical theory into painful ways
of thinking. That such thinking is vital for the enterprise of literary
criticism as such is part of my contention in this essay.
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i. Pease, Crews, Trilling, or is it Matthiessen?, Dreiser, and Parrington:
Marxism, Nazism, and the founding of American literary history
Let me begin by recording a moment in arecent critical conversation
in which discussion of the Holocaust fails to emerge, even though its rele-
vance to that conversation is quite inescapable. Responding to a review
essay by Frederick Crews that is, among other things, a response to his own
work, Donald Pease (1990) cogently summarizes the recent turn in American
literary criticism away from Formalist (New) Criticism to what has come to
be known (following Crews's essay) as the New Americanism. According to
Pease, the post-war New Critics, yielding to the pressures of the World War
and the Cold War, attemptedto separate literature from politics. In so
doing, they seriously neglected the sociopolitical contexts both of the
American literary canon and of their own critical writings. The New
Americanists, in Pease's view, have endeavored to recover that much
maligned link between the political and the literary. They have done this
largely by distinguishing between politics in the sense of a particular
socioeconomic or political agenda, and politics, or ideology, in the sense
of the larger belief system that informs any society or culture. Culture,
the New Americanists point out, is ideologieal, even if a given culture
(America, for example) defines itself through its rejection of certain
ideologies, like totalitarianism or fascism.
Pease anchors his critique of New criticism and its contemporary
exponents in a particular moment in Crews's essay, when Crews turns his
attention to the critical writings of Lionel Trilling. Pease (as New
Americanist), in setting himself in opposition to Crews (as New Critic),
constructs the issue between them in terms of an earlier opposition in
American literary critical history. This is the oppositionbetween F. o.
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Matthiessen and Lionel Trilling, where, in Pease's view, the issue between
Matthiessen and Trilling is Marxism. As Pease notes, Trilling's response
to Matthiessen had to do primarily with Matthiessen's own response to the
work of Theodore Dreiser, who, as Pease records, "had decided to join the
Communist Party in August 1945" (6).
The question I raise is whether Marxism is the only, or even the pri-
mary, issue between Trilling and Matthiessen, or, for that matter, between
Crews and Pease.
Before I venture an answer to this quest ion, let me note several fac-
tors that help justify the direction of my inquiry. First of all, Pease is
hardly alone in placing contemporary literary studies against the back-
ground of the second World War and designating Marxism, or, more precisely,
the resistance to Marxism, as a major determinant of post-War literary cul-
ture. Myra Jehlen, for example, suggests in her introduction to the col-
lection of New Americanist essays she edits with Sacvan Bercovitch that
"the background for the criticism in this volume is not the twenties and
thirties ••• [when American literary criticism, in the New Americanist
view, was still selfconsciously ideological], but the forties and fifties.
This is a crucial distinction because the forties and fifties--
characterized first by war-inspired nationalism, later by the jingoism of
the McCarthy period--essentially reversed the dominant ideological and
cultural thinking of the twenties and thirties" (2). Jehlen's focus on
"war-inspired nationalism" and the McCarthy period (the "Cold War con-
sensus," as Donald Pease refers to it) is shared by other New Americanists
(RusseIl Reising, for example) as weIl as critics of various other literary
persuasions (Murphy, Vanderbilt, Denning; see also Pease's 1985 essay.)
Given the particular emphasis of the New Americanism on uncovering
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lines of sociopolitical cultural bias (as, say, in relation to nineteenth-
century fiction and the issue of slavery), one would think that in desig-
nating the second World War as a formative pressure on American literary
studies, New Americanist criticism would necessarily have to deal with what
was a major and unavoidable issue in this war: antisemitism and the
Holocaust. To be sure, the Holocaust is often implicit in the New
Americanist designation of World War 11 as the background for criticism of
the 1950s, '60s, and '70s. Nonetheless, the events of the Holocaust are
almost never made explicit (the Holocaust, as such, is usually not named),
and even more rarely is the extermination of European Jewry put forward as
a subject, among others, for direct consideration. When the Holocaust is
named, it is almost invariably linked with other, related crimes and
catastrophes of the War era. Three Americanists who in the course of their
literary analyses do address the Holocaust directly are Mark Shechner, Mark
Krupnick, and Gregory Jay. Even for them, however, the Holocaust pales
beside the power of Mar'xism and the Communist Revolution as a factor in the
construction of modern American literary culture. Even for "Jewish intel-
lectuals in the years just following the Second World War," observes Shech-
ner, "the shadows of 1936 (Spain, the Moscow show trials) and 1939
(Stalin's nonaggression pact with Hitler, the carving up of Poland) loomed
even more darkly than those of the death camps in which six million Jews
lost their lives" (8-9; cf. Krupnick, 97-98). For Jay the "background of
the war" includes the Holocaust, but along with "Hiroshima and Nagasaki"
(298); "Auschwitz with Hiroshima" (303).
At this juncture, let me state explicitly that I do not intend to put
anyone on trial, especially not for something that might, in this context,
all-too-sensationalistically be called antisemitism. I think of my own
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interest in the(non)debate concerning the Holocaust in something of the
same terms in which New Americanists have expressed their ideas concerning
the slave/ race/ Indian issues in authors like Hawthorne, Melville, and
Poe. In other words, I take New Historicist critical principles as
legitimizing my own suspicions about what it means that a particular con-
versation is fis not taking place; and I worry all the more that it is/ is
not taking place among a group of literary critics whose critical
priorities seem to demand that such a conversation take place.
So I return to my question. What does is it reveal about the develop-
ment of American literary studies that in the Crews-Pease exchange the
issue heard in Trilling's response to Matthiessen is Marxism? Further, how
do we understand the emergence of Lionel Trilling as a key figure in the
debate concerning the good/bad founders of American literary studies, espe-
cially given the fact that Trilling, despite his deep investment in
American culture, is neither an Americanist nor a New Critic?
This latter fact about Trilling, that he is not a New Critic and that
he even voices sharp objection to the New Critical enterprise makes the New
Americanist response to him extremely puzzling, even more so when one con-
siders that Trilling's ideas resemble no contemporary body of criticism
more than that ofNew Americanism ("The Sense of the Past," LI 177-79).
"What I understand by manners," Trilling explains, "is a culture's hum and
buzz of implication. I mean the whole evanescent context in which its
explicit statements are made" (LI 200). Culture, Trilling states somewhat
later in his career, is the "unitary complex of interacting assumptions,
modes of thought, habits, and styles, which are connected in secret as weIl
as overt ways with the practical arrangements of a society and which,
because they are not brought to consciousness, are unopposed in their
Budick, 7
influence over men's minds" (SA 125). Trilling's definition of the rela-
tion between the literary text and culture anticipates the contemporary
definition of ideology, as put forward, for example, by a critic like Sac-
van Bercovitch. Ideology, writes Bercovitch, is "the ground and texture of
consensus ••• the system of interlinked ideas, symbols, and beliefs by
which a culture--any culture--seeks to justify and perpetuate itself; the
web of rhetoric, ritual, and assumption through which society coerces, per-
suades, and coheres" (PI 635). In a moment I will suggest how Bercovitch's
criticism may differ from that of many New Historicists and New
Americanists. These differences have something to do with Bercovitch's
relation toTrilling. Nonetheless, Bercovitch's definition of ideology
identifies a central assumption of New Americanist criticism generally.
Trilling does not, then, as the New Americanist argument against him
would seem to suggest, place the writer/critic outside society, as if lit-
erature and culture were forces on one side of apower struggle, and
politics and ideology forces on the other side. Trilling specifically
rejects New Criticism for the same reasons that the New Americanists object
to it, because it makes the text autonomous, outside the cultural complex
in whichit exists ("The Sense of the Past," LI 177-79). Like Bercovitch
and others, Trilling is suspicious of what he calls the evanescent (Ber-
covitch calls it the "transcendental") contextualization of culture, by
which both Trilling and Bercovitch mean the way in which culture appeals to
something outside itself, to legitimize and authorize what are only,
finally, the human workings of society. Therefore, Trilling shares with
the New Americanists a commitment to a "hermeneutics of non-transcendence"
(Bercovitch 1992), a dialectical apprehension and explication of culture
through what Bercovitch (thinking perhaps of Wolfgang Iser) calls border-
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crossings (1992). I will have more to say about this hermeneutics of non-
transcendence later.
still, there are differences between Trilling's form of cultural
criticism and that of most of the New Americanists. In order to get at
these differences let me pursue further Pease's objections to Trilling and
Trilling's objections to Matthiessen. These several objections have to do
with these critics' apparently differing definitions of "reality." Accord-
ing to Pease, Trilling desired adefinition of reality (at least that kind
of reality represented in the literary text) that would make it independent
of politicsi therefore, in Pease's way of thinking, Trilling rejected Mat-
thiessen's sense of reality, which turns out to be Dreiser's and Parring-
ton's sense of reality as weIl, because it seemed to Trilling politically
over-determined. But, as I have already begun to suggest, and as Trilling
makes clear in his essay entitled ("tendentiously," according to Pease)
"Reality in America," he does not wish to separate politics and art.
Instead, he wants to discover their relation.
It is because Trilling accepts the idea of literature as political
that he does not, for example, object to Parrington's "lively sense of the
practical, workaday world, of the weIter of ordinary undistinguished things
and people, of the tangible, quirky, unrefined elements of life," which
Trilling considers Parrington's "best virtue." What Trilling resists in
parrington is the way in which "whenever he was confronted with a work of
art that was complex, personal and not literal, that was not, as it were, a
public document, parrington was at a loss." Trilling describes the issue
between himself and Parrington as folIows:
There exists, he believes, a thing called realitYi it is one and
Lmmutablei it is wholly external, it is irreducible. Reality being
fixed and given, the artist has but to let it pass through hLm•••• It
Budick, 9
does not occur to Parrington that there is any other relation pos-
sible between the artist and reality than this passage of reality
through the transparent artist; he meets evidence of imagination and
creativeness with a settled hostility, the expression of which sug-
gests that he regards them as the natural enemies of democracy. (LI
1-3)
In thus limiting the definition of reality, Parrington, in Trilling's view,
"stands at the center of American thought about American culture." This is
exemplified for Trilling in the critical reception of Dreiser, especially
by a critic like Matthiessen, whom Trilling otherwise admires:
This belief in the incompatibility of mind and reality is
exemplified by the doctrinaire indulgence which liberal intellec-
tuals havealways displayed toward Theodore Dreiser, an indulgence
which becomes the worthier of remark when it is contrasted with the
liberal severity toward Henry James. Dreiser and James: with that
juxtaposition we are Lmmediately at the dark and bloody crossroads
where literature and politics meet. One does not go there gladly,
but nowadays it is not exactly a matter of free choice whether one
does or does not go. Few critics ••• have ever been wholly blind
to James's great gifts ••• And few critics have ever been wholly
blind to Dreiser's great faults. But by liberal critics James is
traditionally put to the ultimate question:of what use, of what
actual political use, are his gifts and their intention? ••• But
in the same degree that liberal criticism is moved by political
considerations to treat James with severity, it treats Dreiser with
the most sympathetic indulgence. Dreiser's literary faults, it
gives us to understand, are essentially social and political
virtues. • •• The liberal judgment of Dreiser and James goes back
to politics, goes back to the cultural assumptions that make
politics ••• If it could be conclusively demonstrated ••• that James
explicitly intended his books to be understood as pleas for co-
operatives, labor unions [etc.] the American critic in his liberal
and progressive character wouldstill be worried by James because
his'work shows so many of the electric qualities of mind•••• [1]
In the American metaphysic, reality is always material reality. (LI
8-10)
For Trilling a proof of a serious misstep in American literary criticism
is Matthiessen's defense of Dreiser's novel, The Bulwark. Matthiessen,
Trilling stresses, knows full weIl the limitations of the "Parrington line
of liberal criticism." He is also hardly insensitive to the virtues of
Henry James. "Yet Mr. Matthiessen," Trilling explains, "writing in the New
York Times Book Review about Dreiser's posthumous novel, The Bulwark,
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accepts the liberal cliche [of the Parrington line] which opposes crude
experience to mind and establishes Dreiser's value by implying that the
mind which Dreiser's crude experience is presumed to confront and refute is
the mind of gentility ••• [2]" (LI 12-15).
The issue between Trilling and parrington/ Matthiessen/ Dreiser, I
suggest, is not simply Marxism. It is certainly not whether or not texts
are ideological or political. It is rather, the specific ways in which
texts are ideological or political, and what a given way means for the
relation between culture and specific political ideologies such as Marxism,
fascism, and democracy. Trilling finds Matthiessen's defense of The Bul-
wark unacceptable because of its failure to recognize the full political
dimensions of Dreiser's text. In Trilling's view, Dreiser's book is morally
inadequate and.even offensive, not (as Matthiessen anticipated the attack
would bel because the novel's "renewal of Christianity" marks a "failure of
nerve." Rather, Trilling objects to the book because it represents a
"failure of mind and heart": "we dare not," Trilling writes, "as its hero
does, blandly 'accept' the suffering of others; and the Book of Job teIls
us that it does not include enough in its exploration of the problem of
evil, and is not stern enough" (LI 17). Matthiessen's willingness "undis-
criminatingly" to defend the book on the same realist/materialist grounds
that he defended Dreiser's earlier novels brings into focus what is for
Trilling most deeply distressing about the "Parrington line of liberal
criticism." This is the way in which it "establishes the social
responsibility of the writer and then goes on to say that, apart from his
duty of resembling reality as much as possible, he is not really
responsible for anything, not even for his ideas."
It is this split between social and individual responsibility that
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Trilling utterly rejects, the idea that the novelist's responsibility
extended no further than accurately representing social inequalities and
injustice,. so that, in the end, he or she is "not really responsible for
anything,not even for his [or her] ideas." For Trilling, following the
Holocaust, Dreiser's bland acceptance of the suffering of others, in par-
ticular in a book with an expressly Christian message, signals a specific
danger, especially since one of those "ideas" in Dreiser from which the
liberal imagination had so blithely absolved him of individual moral
responsibility also bore so directly upon Holocaust realities. I now
supply the materials elided in [1] and [2] above:
[1] And if something like the opposite were proved of Dreiser [that
he did not have social interests at heart] it would be brushed
aside--as his doctrinaire anti-Semitism has in fact been brushed
aside--because his books have the awkwardness, the chaos, the heavi-
ness which we associate with 'reality.'
[2] It is much to the point of his intellectual vulgarity that
Dreiser's anti-Semitism was not merely a social prejudice but an
idea, a way of dealing with difficulties.
ii. Cultural conversations, hidden agendas, and the Holocaust: Trilling's
definition of the opposing (i.e., aversive) self
The "hidden agenda" of The Liberal Imagination, suggests steven
Marcus, is Trilling's attack on Stalinism (266). I suggest that, if there
is a hidden agenda in this book, it is as much the confrontation with
antisemitism and the Holocaust.
I will not here go into the details of Trilling's Jewish background,
except to say that it is hardly minimal and that his early career as a stu-
dent at Columbia provides ample evidence of his Jewish concerns. (For
evaluations of Trilling's Jewishness--or lack of it--see Dickstein, Shech-
ner, Krupnick, Klingenstein, and Kazin.) What is relevant to my argument
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here is the way in which Trilling recurs throughout his writings--though
with a certain reserve--to moments of antisemitism within the western
literary tradition, even where the ostensible subject of a given essay
hardly dictates that he refer to matters of Jewishness at all. Aside from
the two Dreiser examples I have already cited, there is, for instance,
Trilling's taking note of Henry Adams's "hateful" "anti-Jewish utterances"
(GF 117) or his reference to the antisemitism of Santayana (GF 155) or his
comment on Joyce's objections to another writer who was antisemitic (LD
46). There are also, of course, Trilling's more sustained attentions to
antisemitism and Jews, not only in some of his early fiction, but, for
example, in his afterword to the republication of Tess Slesinger's The
Unpossessed (reprinted LD 11-14), his essay on Isaac Babel (BC),
"Wordsworth and the Rabbis" (OS)--this essay on Wordsworth might weIl be
taken as Trilling's oblique declaration of Jewish identity--and his review
of C. Virgil Gheorghiu's The Twenty-fifth Hour. In that review Trilling
writes: "Far from forcing upon us an appalled realization of the dreadful-
ness of the recent past, it leads us to ask whether things were not really
much worse than Mr. Gheorghiu says they were. This is in part the result
of a literary inadequacy, but it is also the result of an inadequacy of
moral sensitivitYi one reason Mr. Gheorghiu's picture of the European hor-
ror falls short of the truth is that it deals in so minimaland perverse a
way with the extreme example of that horror, the fate of the Jews" (GF 80).
I do not want to exaggerate the number of Trilling's direct references
to Jews, antisemitism, andtheHolocaust. Given the quantity of writing
that he produced during his career, the number of such explicit references
is relatively small. These references, however, such as they are, permit
us to glimpse an element in Trilling's cultural project that might other-
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wise vanish from view. This element, which (because of the enormity of the
events of the second World War) I am calling Trilling's Holocaust inflec-
tion impels Trilling's resistance to the Parrington line of liberal
criticism. Antisemitism and, later, the Holocaustforced Trilling to see
that the "Jewish Question," as Marx referred to it, was not easily suscep-
tible of a "solution" through either Marxist theory or practice.
The failure of Marxism adequately to address antisemitism, Trilling
was weIl aware, could be understood in several different ways. The most
obvious of these was that a phenomenon like antisemitism, or racism or
sexism, might simply not be referrable to economic realities or simple
power relationships, but might represent a deep-seated, non-socioeconomic,
hatred of one human being for another. The disillusionment of many African
Americans with the Communist party in the 1940s, which forms a central fea-
ture in the fiction of writers like Richard Wright and Ralph Waldo Ellison,
and the movement of African American literature away from realistic modes
of representation in the contemporary period, tell their own story, I
think, of the failure of Marxism adequately to address racism. That story
emerges as weIl, I maintain, in a slightly different telling of it, in
Trilling's criticism and in the subsequent inheritance of that criticism in
the 1960s and '70s. Alfred Kazin puts the case of the Jew and the Com-
munist party very directly: "the Jews had been ruled out of existence by
the Nazis and could not be admitted into the thought of those who were
fighting Hitler. The Jews could not be fitted into Nazi or Communist
schemes" (27). Trilling's writings, I suggest, forcefully address the
story of this exclusion. Kazin is not alone in missing the telling of this
story in Trilling. "Like all of us old liberals," Kazin remarks, "the
Trillings lived on the edge of the abyss created in modern culture, in all
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our cultured minds, by the extermination of the Jews. The case of Alger
Hiss seemed easier to deal with. He was a proven liar" (194). Trilling, I
suggest, was neither the anti-Marxist nor the "non-Jewish Jew" that people
thought him to be (the term non-Jewish Jew is Isaac Deutscher's, revived by
Mark Shechner). Trilling's writings are subtly pervaded by a Jewish con-
sciousness; and they are characterized not by an economically or politi-
cally motivated refusal of Marxism, but by an awareness of the degree to
which Marxist thinking had very little light to shed on, or remedy to offer
for, racism and antisemitism.
But there are other, more complex, reasons for Trilling's resistance
to Marxism as a "solution" to antisemitism. And these go to the heart of
Trilling's Holocaust consciousness and the literary-critical poetics that
emerged in his writings as a consequence of that consciousness. In order
to get at these other reasons, let me turn for a moment to another critical
conversation concerning Trilling, Marxism, and the Holocaust.
For Gregory Jay, as for Pease, Trilling is a pivotal figure in the
debate between the New Critics and the New Historicists. But whereas Pease
emphasizes Trilling's opposition to Marxism and hence his complicity with
the New Criticism, Jay, in the name of Deconstructionism, recalls Trill-
ing's vehement opposition to the New Critics and, going behind Marx,
recovers Trilling's relationship to Hegel (making Trilling, from Jay's
point of view, the true Marxist--297). In Jay's interpretation Trilling
provides an important alternative to New Historicist/ New Americanist
directions in literary criticism. "As an 'other'--Jew, Freudian, Marxist"
(297), struggling both to assimilate to the "authority of Anglo-European
high culture" and to maintain "his allegiance to an 'otherness'" (297),
Trilling, argues Jay, comes closer than the New Historicists to realizing
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the historicism of dialectical Hegelianism. "The modernist 'tragic vision'
Trilling offers in the wake of liberalism's paradoxes and failures," writes
Jay, "focuses on the view that 'the world is a complex and unexpected and
terrible place which is now always to be understood by the mind as we use
it in our everyday tasks.' Set against the background of the war, the
Holocaust, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki, these rather deceptively simple
words take on considerable resonance. The special cognitive virtue of the
literary, according to Trilling, is its dialectical power to reopen the
complexities forec~osed by ideologies" (298).
But, in Jay's view, Trilling regretably swerves away from his
Deconstructionist position. This swerve has to do, Jay suggests, with
Trilling's idea of a "self" (what Jay earlier calls "consciousness"). Here
is Jay's indictment of Trilling, gentle yet decisive:
Hegel's text becomes apretext in Trilling for affirming the
ontological reality of the 'performed' self, the written subject,
who thus recovers from the inauthenticity of repetition and the
impotence or errancy of action•••• The threatened disappearance of
the modern self ••• is remedied [by Trilling] by postulating an
ontological and referential determination of writing by selfhood •
••• Style is freedom, choice, and responsibility, and Trilling can
thus theorize the cohesion of the moral and the aesthetic judgment •
••• Efforts to move past the antinomies of his criticism, and of the
tradition he belonged to, require a thinking of the dialectic of the
literary and the historical that does not subordinate itself to
either a deterministic narrative of the subject's subordination to
Power or an idealistic tale of the achievement of an Absolute Free-
dom for Consciousness. It can only be historical, and political, if
it remembers that history is a way of being that cannot simply be
referred to. Our responsibility is rather to rewrite it, though it
cost us our "I"'s in the process. (302-12)
As a Jew in a post-Holocaust world, Trilling, I maintain, considered
Jay's proposed "cost" of forfeiting the self an impossibly high price to
pay. Trilling's personal commitment to a personal self, which Trilling in
"Wordsworth and the Rabbis" identifies as Wordsworth's commitment to being,
distinguishes Trilling's Jewish, Holocaust consciousness. For Jay, as for
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the New Americanists, the primary victims of American New Criticism were
those many "others" (285) whom New Critical poetics eliminated from the
literary canon. Therefore, in his own telling of the story of American
literary history in the twentieth century, Jay retrieves Trilling as an
"other" (297). What Jay will not grant Trilling, however, (as he will not
grant it to African American critics who have had similar difficulties with
Hegel and his racism) is the specificity of Trilling's otherness: his
Jewishness. It is worth noting in this context (though I would resist
making more of this than it is worth) that Jews are not among the "empiri-
cal others, such as Native Americans, women, and blacks" whom Jay cites in
his list of American "others" (285). Nor is it irrelevant, as I mentioned
earlier, that when he cites the Holocaust as a pivotal event of the second
World War, one which inevitably shaped Trilling's thinking, he couples it
with Hiroshima and Nagasaki (298; Auschwitz with Hiroshima--303).
I do not wish to be mistaken here. The catastrophes at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki are horrifying events of recent human history. They are just as
deserving of our sustained critical and moral consciousness as the events
of the Holocaust. Similarly, it is an important fact about Hitler's Nazism
that he exterminated gypsies and homosexuals as weIl as Jews. But the
devastation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki is different from the devastation at
Auschwitz; and the relationship between Nazism and the Jews is different
from the relationship between Nazism and gypsies and homosexuals. It has
become, in the contemporary period, a common feature of discussions of the
Holocaust (where they occur) to link the Holocaust with other tragedies of
the Hitler period. This diffusing of the consequences of the Holocaust
occurs, for example, in William Styron's Sophie's Choice, in Toni Mor-
rison's Song of Solomon, in Leslea Newman's "A Letter to Harvey Milk," and
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in the poetry of Sylvia Plath. 1 In erasing the differences among moral
violations, these writers, I think, for all the value of their writing, do
at least one kind of violence to moral thinking. They effect, inad-
vertently perhaps, a further erasure of the Jews. New Americanist and
Deconstructive criticism frequently have something of the same effect.
For Trilling the "I" that he is unwilling to relinquish to a full his-
torical dialecticism is hardly simplistic. In fact, in Sincerity and
Authenticity (his last and most Hegelian text) Trilling, working through
the ideas of Raymond Williams and others, formulates an idea of self-
fashioning suggestive of Stephen Greenblatt's later evolution of this con-
cept. For Trilling, as for Greenblatt and many New Historicists, identity
is a socially mediated construct. Nonetheless for Trilling there exists an
"I" that is, as Trilling puts it, "justified its elementary biological
simplicity." This, according to Trilling, was the wise counsel of
Wordsworthian poetry. Wordsworth, writes Trilling, did more than teach us
how "to feel." He "undertook to teach us how to be ." "What does it mean
when we say a person is?" Trilling asks, as he leads into a reading of
Wordsworth's "Idiot Boy" ("Wordsworth and the Rabbis," OS 136-37): "Again
and again in our literature, at its most apocalyptic and intense, we find
the impulse to create figures who are intended to suggest that life is
justified in its elementary biological simplicity, and, in the manner of
Wordsworth, these figures are conceived of as being of simple status and
humble heart: Lawrence's simpler people ••• Dreiser's Jennie Gerhardt
Hemingway's waiters •••• Faulkner's Negroes ••• and idiot boys" (150).
Given that Trilling is writing "Wordsworth and the Rabbis" in the
years Lmmediately following the war, it is not difficult, I think, to
understand Trilling's emphasis on the idea of "being," or to discover what
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motivates Trilling to associate the contemporary rejection of Wordsworth's
poetry with a particular and vicious historical phenomenon: "the quality in
Wordsworth that now makes him unacceptable," Trilling specifies, "is a
Judaic quality" (123). Nor are the reasons for Trilling's particular for-
mula for distinguishing between this elemental being (human beings in their
biological simplicity) and the evolution of a morally responsible self
particularly obscure. He writes:
How was a man different from an individual? A person born before a
certain date, a man--had he not eyes? had he not hands, organs,
dimensions, senses, affections, passions? If you pricked him, he
bled and if you tickled him, he laughed. (SA 24)
For Trilling, the Holocaust necessitated thinking, not simply about social
injustice (as Marxism had undertaken to do) or about undoing ideology (as
in dialectical Hegelianism, as it has been evolved by Deconstruction), but
about the very definition of the human--the person, the human being, in
Trilling's specific case, the Jew.
It is not irrelevant to Trilling's relationship to Marxism that of the
major figures who created modern culture, Marx was certainly oneof the
more virulently antisemitic--though, of course, T. S. Eliot, standing in
various ways behind the New Criticism, and Hegel and Heidegger, standing
behind Deconstruction, are tainted in similar ways. Nonethless, this does
not release us from the necessity of considering, in the case of Marx as in
the case of all of these figures, how, precisely, we want to understand
their antisemitism in relation to the cultural circulations in which they
took part and which may, indeed, put that circulation beyond, say, a merely
Marxist or Hegelian understanding. For Trilling, Marxism must necessarily
fail before the threat of antisemitism because, like Nazism, it imagined
the "Jewish" as a "Question" in need of a "solution" or removal: "Let us
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look at the real Jew of our time," writes Marx in A World without Jews
(part one was published as The Jewish Question); "not the Jew of the Sab-
bath ••• but the Jew of everyday life. What is the Jew's foundation in our
world? Material necessity, private advantage. What is the object of the
Jew's worship in this world? Usury. What is his worldy god? Money. Very
weIl then; emancipation from usury and money, that is, from practical, real
Judaism, would constitute the emancipation of our time" (37).
From Trilling's point of view, Marx's solution to the Jewish Question
was only marginally better than Hitler's. He demanded the disappearance of
the Jew as Jew, as of the Christian as Christian. (As Ludwig Lewisohn puts
it, "the world's peoples wanted us to be emancipated not as ourselves from
from ourselves" --13). But what if (for whatever reasons) Jews and
Christians did not wish to disappear? One is reminded here of a statement
made by Toni Morrison concerning African American identity. Until the con-
temporary period, she suggests, race made all the difference in the world
to white society. Now that African Americans have claimed that difference
as their own, imbued it withpower and beauty, race, according to the white
world, makes no difference at all. With regard to Trilling's dissatisfac-
tion with Marxism, we might say, similarly, that Marxism made no provision
for Jewish difference, for the self-declared otherness and identity of a
people, who might wish to exist and live as a distinct people.
Marxism made no provision, as weIl, for an individual who might wish
to exist and live in his or her private human being. This question of Mar-
xism and the individual returns me to Trilling's critique of the Parrington
line of liberal criticism. To imagine reality as exclusively "material"
(which is to say, socioeconomic), and to imagine, further, the text as a
transparency reproducing this reality was, from Trilling's perspective,
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exactly not to acknowledge the writer/critic's place within the construc-
tion of culture and, therefore, his or her moral responsibility within it.
It was instead to exempt the writer/critic as standing somehow outside cul-
ture, as if she or he could, or should, do no other thing than render the
world back to itself. In fact, from Trilling's point of view, the Marxist
definition of literary criticism doubly distanced the writer/critic from
culture. In the first place, the material theory of reality declares that
morality is not the province of writers to define but exists in a trans-
cendental place outside culture (in the case of Marxist criticism, it rests
with Marxist economic and political theory). In the second place, it makes
the function of writers to reflect or reveal societal ills as functions,
not of the writers' self-perceptions and self-incriminations, but of time-
less and universal metaphysical truths about culture.
After the Holocaust, Trilling was not so willing to give up either on
the idea of individual being or on personal moral responsibility. This is
so, not because the individual moral self epitomized for Trilling a
metaphysical or religious truth beyond or outside culture to which culture
might appeal and make itself accountable. Quite the contrary. Since, in
Trilling's view, there is nothing outside culture to which culture can
apply, and since culture is only a human construction, human beings must
individually assume ethical responsibility. I will not broach here the
complexities of Trilling's definition of the self, which I discuss else-
where, in a reading of Trilling's "Wordsworth and the Rabbis." I will,
however, note that by an "opposing self" Trilling does not mean an
essentialist, unitary identity (which stands in an oppositional, outsider,
relationship to society, which then constitutes the non-self or, in con-
temporary terms, the other). Rather, he means a self that is definable by
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its relationship to other selves, within the context of culture. From the
point of view of the self, these other selves do possess definitive
identity. It is Trilling's hope that in a moral society every self will
accord, and also be accorded, this courtesy of imagining others, and not
itself, as possessing essential identity. Thus for Trilling, in
"Wordsworth and the Rabbis," Wordsworth is not Christian but non-Jew, while
Trilling is not Jew but non-Christian. Trilling's ideas here bear strong
affinities to Stanley Cavell's idea (recently given important, new, treat-
ment in his Harvard-Jerusalem lectures) of the "aversive" relationship
between individuals within society. This relationship, as expressed by
Emerson, for example, so ties together individuals within society as to
transform opposition or the turn-away-from (aversion) into a turning-toward
or engaging of others within the shared world of culture ("Aversive Think-
ing"i Trades of Philosophy: Harvard-Jerusalem Lectures).
In ways similar to the thinking of the New Americanists, for Trilling
culture is a non-transcendent place. Cultural criticism, therefore, con-
stitutes for Trilling what Bercovitch (as I have already noted) calls a
hermeneutics of non-transcendence. For Trilling and Bercovitch both such a
hermeneutics of non-transcendence empowers rather than limits human
authority, and it is here that the Trilling-Bercovitch line of cultural
criticism separates from other branches of the same family. In arecent
reflection on his own development as an Americanist, Bercovitch makes the
point as folIows:
America was more than a figment of the imagination, an imperial
wish-fulfillment dream brought to life in the assertion of nation-
hood. It was a way of imagining that expressed the mechanisms
through which the made-up becomes the made-real. • •• The music of
America ••• sounded to me like ideology, but it was ideology in a
new key, requiring ablend of cognitive and appreciative analysis.
Benjamin contrasts empathic understanding with historical
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materialism, an adversarial outlook of 'cautious detachment' which,
aware of the 'origin' of culture, "cannot contemplate [its subject]
without horror." I sought a mode of mediation between horror and
empathy.
Inspired by but resisting Walter Benjamin, Bercovitch searches for a place
whereindividuals exist, neither outside culture nor hopelessly locked into
it, but in a creative, meaning-making and, equally important,
responsibilty-assuming place within it. The discovery of this place of
meaning-making and moral responsibility is, I suggest, exactly Trilling's
aim, and it marks the specific Holocaust-inflection of his writing. For
if, as Trilling and Bercovitch both argue, we are always within the
culturalmoment we would decode, then how we place ourselves in relation to
our society may not represent a choice between opposition to or implication
in it. Rather it may decide whether we will help construct the major
issues of our time, or merely be constructed by them.
Silently speaking dissent in America
At the beginning of this essay I noted that my concern here is not in
examining direct literary-critical confrontations with the Holocaust, but,
instead, with locating moments of what I called "silent" speaking about the
Holocaust. The power of Trilling's writing derives, I believe, from the
ways in which it manages such silent speaking-~the ways, that is, in which
Trilling's texts give us just enough signalling to turn us toward a con-
templation of the Holocaust without making the Holocaust the exclusive sub-
ject of his investigation. In thus approaching the Holocaust as part of
his interest in the activity of cultural construction, Trilling, I suggest,
enters into a tradition of American authors (amongthem Emerson and
Thoreau, Hawthorne andMelville) who also addressed the major social issues
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of their t~e obliquely. Their reasons for such ideological indirection,
like Trilling's, had to do with their recognition of a hermeneutics of non-
transcendence. For Trilling, Hawthorne, and an entire tradition of
American authors, the fact of our always being inside the culture we would
critique required that we abandon moral-system-making for a less glamorous,
more arduous kind of activity. This is the never-completed process of
rearticulating our respect for "being."
In defining Trilling's silent speaking in this way, I intend to dif-
ferentiate it from other forms of what could also seem to be Holocaust-
inflected silence. I am thinking here, for example, of the writings of
Paul de Man, particularly as they have been defended by Geoffrey Hartman,
Shoshana FeIman, and Jacques Derrida. Trilling's cultural criticism, as I
tried to demonstrate in my discussion of Jay, is not literary Deconstruc-
tion. Even if we grant the embeddedness of de Man's silence in the
selfconsciousness of Deconstruction, Trilling's silence is not de Man's.
Nonetheless, Trilling's silent speaking raises problems. The very fact
that sensitive contemporary critics (like Pease) do not hear Trilling's
discourse as a speaking about antisemitism and the Holocaust (as gener-
ations of readers did not hear the subject of slavery silently spoken in
the writings of Emerson, Thoreau, and others), raises inevitable questions
about Trilling's critical project.
In arecent essay on Emerson, Stanley Cavell has analyzed Emerson's
apparent silence (at least in his major philosophical essays) on the sub-
jectof slavery. Cavell understands this silence, in particular in "Fate"
but in "Self-Reliance" as weIl, as part of Emerson's effort to separate
polemics from philosophy and to constitute and preserve philosophy as that
which constitutes and preserves human freedom. Yet, reading back through
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Heidegger's evolution of Emerson's thought as that thought was mediated by
Nietzsehe, Cavell wonders whether philosophy has not been tainted by its
silenees, in relation both to slavery and to Nazi antisemitism. Cavell's
comments, I suggest, usefully apply as weIl to other nineteenth-century
authors, such as Hawthorne, Melville, and Thoreau, who also did and did not
speak to the subject of slavery. These comments illuminate the case of
Lionel Trilling as weIl.
It is not difficult to understand why Trilling hesitates in speaking
directly about the Holocaust. He is resisting sensationalistic discourse,
the kind of language that, in Trilling's view, characterizes, and com-
promises, what he calls the "intense social awareness" of twentieth-century
American fiction. Modern fiction, Trilling acknowledges, rightfully con-
cerns itself with "the situation of the dispossessed Oklahoma farmer and
whose fault it is, what situation the Jew finds himself in, what it means
to be a Negro" (208). But modern fiction is also, in his view, given to
irresponsible, exploitative, and ultimately dangerous rhetorical excess.
The "extreme" instance of this excess that Trilling cites is a novel by
John Dash, which has "attracted a great number of readers ••• because of
its depiction of Nazi brutality" and the "stark realism" of its "torture
scenes." Trilling's objection to this book has to do with the way in which
"pleasure in cruelty isprotected and licensed by moral indignation."
For Trilling the task of literature is not to confirm some simple defini-
tion of morality. Rather it is to examine what "lie[s] behind our sober
intelligent interest in moral politics":
I have elsewhere given the name of moral realism to the perception
of the dangers of the moral life itself. Perhaps at no other time
has the enterprise of moral realism ever been so much needed, for at
no other time have so many people co,mmitted themselves to moral
righteousness. We have the books that point out the bad conditions,
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that praise us for taking progressive attitudes. We have no books
that raise questions in our minds not only about conditions but
about ourselves, that lead us to refine our motives and ask what
might lie behind our good impulses. There is nothing so very ter-
rible in discovering that something does lie behind. (LI 213; recall
here Trilling's objection to Dreiser's The Bulwark, that "it does
not include enough in its exploration of the problem of evil, and is
not stern enough"--LI 17)
In avoiding directly political language and in pointing the moral question
toward the examination of what lies behind our morality, Trilling resembles
no earlier critic of American culture more than Emerson, as when Emerson
writes in "Self-Reliance":
Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist. He who would gather
immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but
must explore if it be goodness. If malice and vanity wear the
coat of philanthropy, shall that pass? If any angry bigot assumes
this bountiful case of Abolition, and comes to me with his last news
from Barbadoes, why should I not say to him, "Go love thy infant;
love thy wood-chopper, be good-natured and modest; have that grace;
and never varnish your hard, uncharitable ambition with this
incredible tenderness for black folk a thousand miles off. Thy love
afar is spite at home."2
Like Emerson (and others in the American tradition), Trilling would get
behind goodness to explore whether it be goodness, and why. But the power-
ful silence of Trilling's speaking does not, in his case any more than in
the case of the nineteenth-century American writers vis-a-vis slavery,
remove the objection that in speaking silently Trilling inadvertently may
have conspired in the erasure of Jewish consciousness and memory, which is
to say, in the erasure of the Jew.
Such silent speaking as Trilling practices places us on the horns of a
dilemma. The solution to this dilemma cannot be areversion to direct
political rhetoric, because such areversion would only represent silence
of a different kind--the silent refusal to hear the variety of moral dis-
course that Trilling and his tradition write. This dilemma returns us to
the conversation between Crews and Pease, which is to say between New
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Criticism and New Americanism. Contemporary Americanist criticism faults
New Critical readings of nineteenth-century texts for failing to locate the
sociopolitical issues that generated those texts. Yet by failing to locate
the sociopolitical issues--inall their nuance and detail--that generated
the New Critical readings (including the cultural criticism of Lionel
Trilling) New Americanists risk replicating, not silent speaking, but--at
least in relation to Jews and the Holocaust--silence itself.
NOTES
1 In arecent remake of Ernst Lubitsch's To be or not to be, to
take an example from popular culture, Mel Brooks makes the vic-
tims of Nazi oppression equally gypsy, homosexual, and Jew.
2 Note the following statement by Quentin Anderson: "We have not
••• paid any attention to Trilling's urgent warning that the
characteristic political mode among intellectuals masks our
impulses from our awareness •••• It was not Lionel Trilling who
abandoned the politics of liberal democracy •••• It was Trill-
ing's contemporaries who, by their refusal of the human condi-
tion, and their love affair with an authoritarian politics •••
proceeded to charge Trilling with disloyality to apocalypse. The
quality of a democracy is to be measured not simply by its formal
extension of rights to all, but by the capacity of its citizens
to extend recognition to the full personhood of their fellow
citizens. Our love of pattern and abstraction does not help us
to extend this recognition, and it is disabling rather than use-
ful when we are struggling with immediate quest ions like the
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